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1. Introduction  
The concept of national systems of innovation (NSI) first emerged in the early 
1990s with the seminal contributions of Lundvall (1992) and Nelson (1993). 
Subsequently it has attracted the attention of many in ovation researchers and policy-
makers (Amable 2000; Edquist 1997, 2005; Freeman 1997, 2002; Mytelka and Smith 
2002; OECD 1997, 2002; Saviotti 1996) and has rapidly achieved broad international 
diffusion in both developed and developing countries (Correa 1998; Kaiser and Prange 
2004; Liu and White 2001; Niosi 1991). However, progress in refining the SI concept has 
been uneven and difficult to assess, given that “no single definition has yet imposed 
itself” on NSI theory and research (Niosi 2002:  291). As argued previously (Edquist 
2005: 201 – 203), there is a need for theoretically based empirical research to ‘straighten 
up’ the approach – a project to which comparative research on varieties of innovation 
systems, as well as determinants of innovation processes within them, can make 
particularly valuable contributions.   
This article reports on the findings of a comparative study of ten ‘small economy’ 
NSIs in Europe and Asia, conducted from 2003 to 2006 under the auspices of the 
European Science Foundations (ESF) and participating national science councils. This 
study, referred to by participants as the ‘Ten Country Project’, was initiated some ten 
years after the publication of Lundvall’s (1992) and Nelson’s (1993) landmark 
anthologies on NSIs,  and had the aim of contributing to further refinement and 
elaboration of the NSI concept. Contributors included national research teams in 
Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, Ireland, (South) Korea, The Netherlands, Norway, 
Singapore, Sweden and Taiwan.2  
Theoretically, the project was informed by the contrast between the ‘broad’ 
conception of NSIs championed by Lundvall (1992)  and  the ‘narrow’ approach 
promoted by Nelson (1993), as previously discussed by Edquist (1997, 2005). However, 
its aim was not simply to replicate and test existing frameworks but rather to contribute to 
further development by adopting a new approach. Whereas both of the original 
frameworks for studying NSIs were focused strongly on ‘actors’ within the systems, the 
                                               
 
1 This article is based on the introductory and concluding chapters for the forthcoming anthology: Edquist 
C. and Hommen, L (Eds.). 2006 - forthcoming. Small economy innovation systems: Comparing 
globalisation, change and policy in Asia and Europe. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, UK.     
2 We have adopted the common term countries here, but Hong Kong is not, properly speaking, a country in 
the sense of a nation-state. Formerly a British Crown Colony, Hong Kong was made a Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China by the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 
1984, and assumed that status in 1999. However, the 1984 Joint Declaration ensured  preservation of  Hng 
Kong’s capitalist system and ‘way of life’ for 50 years, and this principle is reflected in the ‘one country-two 
systems’ framework that was subsequently enshrined in the constitution of the Hong Kong SAR. 
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comparative framework employed in this project instead followed Edquist’s (2005) 
recent proposals to develop a central focus on fundamental ‘activities’ within systems of 
innovation. The project also sought to counter the criticism that NSI analyses pay too 
little attention to ‘external’ factors by explicitly taking into account processes of 
globalization. The comparative analysis reported in this article addresses the complex 
relations between growth and innovation, the issues rai ed by globalization, and the 
implications for innovation policy. A range of other issues will be addressed in the 
forthcoming book (Edquist and Hommen 2006) on ‘small economy’ national systems of 
innovation. It will include 10 country studies follwing the same table of contents, a 
theoretical introduction and a concluding comparative chapter. 
One of the key questions that we address below concerns the validity of 
competing NSI concepts – the aforementioned ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ approaches to 
defining NSIs. For the most part, these two frameworks have not confronted one another 
directly within the research literature. Instead, researchers have tended to adopt one or the 
other of these two basic approaches, or to elaborate v riants of them, without giving 
much consideration to the alternative approach. Thus, L ndvall et al. (2002: 217, n.2) 
have discussed the further development of their ‘broad’ approach to NSIs without making 
many explicit comparisons with the ‘narrow’ approach, except to comment that the 
‘broad’ approach is particularly “relevant for understanding economic growth and 
innovation processes in small countries”. Similarly, Laredo and Mustar (2001) have 
applied the ‘narrow’ version of the NSI concept in their international survey of research 
and innovation policies without much consideration of its merits relative to the ‘broad’ 
alternative. It is fair to say that although the two versions of the NSI concept have 
enjoyed a peaceful coexistence, there has been only mi imal dialogue between them. We 
will return to this question in the theoretical discu sion that follows, as well as in our 
analysis and conclusions. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. This introductory section is 
immediately followed by an extended theoretical discussion, which compares the ‘broad’ 
and ‘narrow’ NSI concepts, outlines an activities-based based framework to studying SIs 
and identifies key problems to be addressed in resea ch on SIs. Subsequently, we discuss 
the methods used to operationalize the ‘activities’ approach within the Ten Countries 
Project. Thereafter, we categorize the ten NSIs included in the project, and develop an 
overview of the NSIs. We then discuss some key findings from the project and the main 
conclusions that can be drawn from them. Finally, we consider policy implications.  
 
 
2. Theoretical and Practical Issues in Research on NSIs 
In this section we outline some central theoretical and practical issues in research 
on NSIs. The main theoretical issue, ultimately deriving from definitional differences, 
concerns the character and coherence of NSIs – i.e., whether or not they are truly 
‘systemic’ in the sense that the whole has properties distinct from those of its constituent 
parts. Practical issues include both the requirements of comparative research on NSIs and 





2.1. ‘Narrow’ versus ‘Broad’ Approaches to Studying NSIs 
 
As discussed elsewhere (e.g., in Edquist and Chaminade 2006), the term ‘national 
system of innovation’ (NSI) was first used in published form by Freeman (1987). He 
defined an NSI as “the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose 
activities and interactions initiate, import, and diffuse new technologies” (ibid.: 1).3 
Subsequently, Lundvall (1992) and Nelson (1993) both published major anthologies on 
NSIs, but used different approaches to the study of NSIs. Nelson (1993) emphasised 
empirical case studies more than theory development and some of the studies in his book 
focussed narrowly on national research and development (R&D) systems.4 Moreover, 
these case studies were not designed to have the sam  tructure and focus. In contrast, 
Lundvall (1992) was more theoretically oriented and sought to develop an alternative to 
the neo-classical economics tradition by placing interactive learning, user-producer 
interaction, and innovation at the centre of the analysis.  
Lundvall argued that “the structure of production” and “the institutional set-up” are 
the two most important dimensions that “jointly define a system of innovation” (Lundvall 
1992: 10). In a similar way, Nelson and Rosenberg (1993) singled out organisations 
supporting R&D -- i.e., they emphasised those organisations that promote the creation 
and dissemination of knowledge as the main sources of innovation. Organisations 
disseminating knowledge include firms, industrial research laboratories, research 
universities, and government laboratories. Lundvall’s broader approach recognised, 
though,  that such  organisations are “embedded in a much wider socio-economic system 
in which political and cultural influences as well as economic policies help to determine 
the scale, direction and relative success of all innovative activities.” (Freeman 2002: 195) 
Thus, both Nelson and Lundvall defined NSIs in terms of determinants of, or factors 
influencing, innovation processes.5 However, they specified different determinants in 
their definitions of the concept, presumably reflecting their judgment about the most 
important determinants of innovation. Hence, they proposed different definitions, but 
used the same term, reflecting the lack of a generally accepted definition of NSIs.  
Nelson and Lundvall not only offered definitions of NSIs that focussed on their 
components (e.g., main actors and institutions and relations among them).  They also 
expressed fundamental differences of opinion concerning the structural integrity of NSIs. 
Lundvall (1992) stressed the continuing importance of NSIs, even under conditions of 
increasing globalization and regionalization – trends that challenge the unity and 
coherence of national systems.  One of his main arguments for this position was that 
                                               
3 Freeman here means “organisations” in the sense of players and not “institutions” in the sense of rules. In 
addition, we currently use the term innovations instead of technologies – implying that we include new 
creations also of a non-material nature, e.g. servic  product innovations and organisational process 
innovations. Finally, it is interesting to note that in 1987 Freeman had already pointed out the “activities” 
carried out by the organisations – see below in this article. 
4 This emphasis is crystal clear from Nelson and Rosenberg (1993, p.4): “…the orientation of this project 
has been to carefully describe and compare, and try to understand, rather than to theorise first and then 
attempt to prove or calibrate the theory”. 
5 Their definitions of NSIs do not include, e.g., consequences of innovation. This does not mean that 
innovations emerging in SIs do not have tremendously important consequences for socio-economic 
variables such as productivity growth and employment – on the contrary. Moreover, distinguishing 
between determinants and consequences does not, of c urse, exclude feedback mechanisms between them. 
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current processes of change and transformation must be understood in relation to the “old 
order” upon which they act – i.e., the pre-existing pattern of  ”interaction between 
institutions and economic structure … at the national level” (ibid.: 4). A further 
implication is that since the “old order” conditions these evolutionary processes, it is 
likely to be reflected (and thus partly continued) in distinctive national trajectories. In 
contrast, Nelson (1993) acknowledged that NSIs have tended to exhibit institutional 
continuity over time, but nevertheless expressed considerable scepticism about the 
overall coherence or consistency of NSIs in terms of industrial structure. Thus, he 
questioned whether “the concept of a national system [makes] sense, nowadays“, given 
pronounced sectoral differences in “the system[s] of institutions supporting technical 
innovation” and the growth of strong “transnational” institutions in many fields of 
technology (1992: 350). A key implication of this lne of reasoning is that NSIs may 
ultimately be largely reducible to ensembles of sectoral systems of innovation (SSIs). 
In order to test these rival propositions of the two original approaches to studying 
NSIs, we require a definition of NSIs that encompasses both the ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ 
definitions discussed above. A more general definitio  of an SI includes “all important 
economic, social, political, organizational, institutional and other factors that influence 
the development, diffusion and use of innovations” (Edquist 1997: 14). If an SI definition 
does not include all factors that influence innovation processes, one has to argue which 
potential factors should be excluded – and why. This is quite difficult since, at the present 
state of the art, we do not know the determinants of innovation systematically and in 
detail. Obviously, then, we could miss a great deal by excluding some determinants, since 
they might prove to be very important once the state of the art has advanced. For 
example, 25 years ago, it would have been natural to exclude the interactions between 
organisations as a determinant of innovation processes. Both the relationships among the 
factors listed and the actions of both firms and governments are included in the general 
definition above. This definition, moreover, is fundamental to the ‘activities’ approach to 
studying SIs (Edquist 2005; Edquist and Chaminade 2006) that we now turn to discuss. 
 
2.2. An Activities-based Framework for Comparing SIs
  Everyday language and the scientific literature give a common answer to the 
question ‘What is a system?, focussing on three features (Ingelstam 2002). First, a system 
consists of two types of constituents: components and relations among them. The 
components and relations should form a coherent whole, with properties different from 
those of the constituents. Second, the system has a function -- i.e., it is performing or 
achieving something. Third, it must be possible to discriminate between the system and 
the rest of the world -- that is, it must be possible to identify the boundaries of the 
system.6 Obviously, for empirical studies of specific systems, one must know their 
extension. 
Making the SI approach more theory-like does not requir  specifying all 
components and all relations among them. At present, it is not a matter of transforming 
the SI approach into a general theory of innovation, but one of making it clearer and more 
consistent so that it can better serve as a basis for generating hypotheses about relations 
                                               
6  Only in exceptional cases is the system closed in the sense that it has nothing to do with the rest of the 
world (or because it encompasses the whole world). Like the SI approach, general systems theory might be 
considered an approach rather than a theory. 
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between specific variables within SIs (which might be rejected or supported through 
empirical work). Even the much more modest objectiv of specifying the main (rather 
than all) functions of SIs, their activities and components, and the key relations among 
the latter would represent a considerable advance. Us d in this way, the SI approach can 
help to develop theories about relations between spcific variables within SIs. 
As indicated in the foregoing discussion of definitional issues, as well as in other 
sources (e.g., Niosi  2002: 291, Table 1), there seem  to be general agreement in the 
literature that the main components in SIs are institutions and organisations – among 
which firms are often considered to be the most important organisations. However, 
particular definitions specify different sets of institutions and organizations and, 
moreover, specific set-ups of institutions and organis tions vary among systems. 
Consequently, comparative research on SIs is doubly difficult. Even if we can bypass 
definitional disputes to some extent by adopting an om ibus definition of SIs including 
all determinants of innovation processes, we are left with the problem of functional 
equivalence -- i.e., the “many ways countries may develop … to organize what some 
would argue are ‘functionally equivalent’ activities” (Kogut 1993: 7). For example, the 
activity of R&D can be performed by different organisations, such as universities, public 
research organisations and firms. Our solution to this particular problem has been to 
develop a central focus on such activities.  
Generally, the main or ‘overall’ function of SIs is to pursue innovation processes: 
that is, to develop and diffuse innovations. What we, from here on, call ‘activities’ in SIs 
are those factors that influence the development and diffusion of innovations. In this 
sense, we use the term activities as equivalent to determinants of the innovation process. 
Since the late 1990s, some authors have addressed iues related to specification of  
activities influencing the overall function of SIs (Galli and Teubal 1997; Johnson and 
Jacobsson 2003; Liu and White 2001; Rickne 2000). As argued elsewhere (Chaminade 
and Edquist 2006), we can broadly distinguish four main approaches to analysing 
activities in SIs. 
To start with, Edquist (2005), Furman et al. (2002) and, though to a lesser extent, 
Liu and White (2001) focus on activities linked to the innovation process as such – i.e., 
activities needed to turn an idea into a new product or process. A second approach, 
represented by the work of David and Foray (1995) and Johnson and Jacobsson (2003) 
concentrates on activities linked to the knowledge production process – i.e., how 
knowledge is created, transferred, and exploited. Here there is a strong emphasis on 
channels and mechanisms for knowledge distribution. Third, some researchers (e.g., 
Borrás 2004) try to identify the activities of different organisations that have an impact in 
the innovation system. Finally, a fourth line of research focuses on innovation policy. The 
main question pursued is which activities (and organisations) in SIs can be stimulated by 
public intervention. The OECD (2002) and other inter ational organisations follow this 
approach.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
 
Clearly, there is no consensus as to which activities should be included in an SI 
and this provides abundant opportunities for further research. In Table 1 we present a 
provisional list of ten priority activities that we have adopted as a basis for systematic 
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comparison of SIs. This list of activities is based on the literature (reflecting the research 
approaches mentioned above) and on our own knowledge about innovation processes and 
their determinant. It is structured into four thematic categories: (i) the provision of 
knowledge inputs to the innovation process, (ii) demand side activities, the (iii) provision 
of constituents of SIs, and (iv) support services for innovating firms. This list is 
provisional and will be subject to revision as our knowledge about determinants of 
innovation processes increases. In addition to a set of activities that is likely to be 
important in most NSIs, there are activities that are very important in some types of SIs 
and less important in others. For example, the creation of technical standards is critically 
important in some (sectoral) systems, such as mobile telecommunications.7 
The activities-based approach to SIs suggested here does not imply that these 
systems are or can be consciously designed or planned. On the contrary, just as 
innovation processes are evolutionary, SIs evolve or time in a largely unplanned 
manner. Even if we knew all the determinants of innovations processes in detail (which 
we certainly do not now, and perhaps never will), we ould not be able to control them 
and design or ‘build’ SIs on the basis of this knowledge. Centralised control over SIs is 
impossible and policy can only influence their spontaneous development to a limited 
extent. 
 
2.3.  Applications to Public Policy 
Thus far, we have argued that an ‘activities-based’ framework enables us to 
address some longstanding theoretical debates concerni g the character and dynamics of 
SIs.  We have additionally argued that one of the main advantages of such a framework is 
to provide a basis for systematic international comparisons that can avoid the pitfalls of 
structurally based or actor-oriented NSI definitions. In what follows, we will advance the 
claim that an ‘activities-based’ framework is also very useful for identifying and assessing 
policy issues within SIs. We will argue in particular that this framework – and, more 
generally, the systemic approach on which it is based – is superior to the conventional 
‘market failure’ approach to specifying and evaluating the grounds for policy intervention. 
As discussed elsewhere (e.g., Edquist 1997; Edquist 2001), market failure in 
mainstream economic theory implies a comparison betwe n conditions in the real world 
and an ideal or optimal economic system. However, innovation processes are path 
dependent over time, and it is not clear which path will be taken as they have 
evolutionary characteristics. We do not know whether the potentially optimal path is 
being exploited. Moreover, the system never achieves equilibrium. For these reasons, the 
notion of optimality is irrelevant in an innovation context. It follows that we cannot 
specify an ideal or optimal system of innovation and, therefore, comparisons between an 
existing system and an optimal system are not possible, and – as a corollary – it is not 
meaningful to talk about optimal policies. Thereby, the notion of market failure loses its 
meaning and applicability.  
Instead of market failure, researchers following a systemic approach often speak 
of systemic problems.8 In contrast to the conventional approach outlined above, the main 
focus of the systemic approach is the complex interactions that take place among the 
                                               
7 The activities in this sectoral system of innovation are discussed in Edquist (2003). 
8 This means that the systemic approach decreases the degree of rigour and formality. It specifies 
‘problems’ on an empirical basis and in a pragmatic way – not by referring to a formal model. 
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different organisations and institutions that constitute the system of innovation. From this 
perspective, policy makers need to intervene in those areas where the system is not 
functioning well. The rationale for innovation policy should therefore be based on 
‘systemic’ failures or problems rather than on ‘market’ failures (Chaminade and Edquist, 
2006; Edquist 2001; Edquist and Chaminade 2006). A variety of systemic problems are 
mentioned in the relevant literature (Smith 2000; Woolthuis et al. 2005), referring to 
deficiencies in infrastructure and organisational cpabilities, evolutionary obstacles 
rooted in risk and uncertainty, institutional hurdles (both regulatory and cultural) faced by 
innovative actors, and barriers (cognitive and other) to effective networking. These 
various kinds of problems commonly point to institutional and organizational issues that 
can not be conceptualized or addressed exclusively n terms of the (ideal) operation of 
market mechanisms. Instead, they identify bottlenecks, discontinuities, gaps and 
inconsistencies that reflect “ he contextually specific nature of innovation processes” 
(Smith 2002: 1477).  
As argued elsewhere (Edquist and Chaminade 2006), the ‘activities’ framework 
for  analysing SIs proposed above can fruitfully be us d for innovation policy purposes, 
since the activities that influence innovation processes in SIs provide a useful point of 
entry into policy analysis. Thereafter, one can identify the organisations performing the 
activities and examine the relations among them.  Often, there is not a one-to-one relation 
between organisations and activities, since a certain kind of organisation can perform 
more than one activity and many activities can involve more than one category of 
organisation. With respect to innovation policy, wecan analyse the division of labour 
between private and public organisations with regard to the performance of each of the 
activities in innovation systems and determine whether his division of labour is justified 
or not. Key questions regarding the grounds for policy intervention are, first, whether 
there exists a systemic problem not spontaneously solved by private actors and market 
forces (i.e., firms and markets fail to achieve given public policy objectives) and, second, 
whether government bodies or public agencies have the ability to solve or mitigate the 
problem (Edquist 2001). The policy discussion at each point should focus on changes in 
the division of labour between the private and the public spheres and on changes in those 
activities already carried out by the public agencis. This includes not only adding new 
public policy activities but also – and not least importantly -- terminating others.  
As noted above, one of the main differences between conventional (or mainstream 
economics) and systemic approaches to innovation policy is that the conventional 
approach begins by trying to define an ideal or optimal market model, whereas the 
systemic approach focuses on interactions among the constituents of an innovation 
system, and compares existing systems with each other. These two approaches tend to 
define problems very differently, and they also recommend different overall strategies for 
problem-solving. One of the main differences between the two approaches is therefore 
reflected in current debates on non-selective versus selective innovation policies. In this 
respect, current understandings of innovation policy are divided into two main camps. A 
non-interventionist  “laissez-faire version … [which] signals that the focus should be on 
‘framework conditions’ rather than specific sectors or technologies” competes with a 
“’systemic’ version … [for which] a fundamental aspect … becomes the reviewing and 
redesigning of the linkages between the parts of the [innovation] system” (Lundvall and 
Borrás 2005: 611). From the systemic perspective, innovation policy – like most other 
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public policy -- is naturally selective, since even policies that try to avoid ‘picking 
winners’ by addressing market operations in general tend in practice to favour certain 
sectors, often preserving “the existing structure of production” and already established 
technological trajectories (Edquist 2001: 224 – 225).  
The question then becomes in which direction or in which respects the innovation 
policy is – or should be – selective? Most large firms in established sectors of production 
pursue lobbying intended to make public actors support their own sectors and firms. New 
and nascent sectors normally do not include strong actors and can therefore not pursue 
lobbying in an effective way. However, public innovation policy intervention is generally 
more justifiable in new sectors or in new operations i  established sectors, since 
“problems” that are not solved or mitigated by private organis tions are more frequent in 
these contexts. This argument can be supported in the following way: 
• Private organisations and markets have the greatest problems in handling 
new activities where uncertainty and risk are largest. In such operations 
there is a strong risk that firms will underinvest in R&D, or abstain from 
development activities since it is unclear if there is a market for the 
potential new products. Publicly financed R&D, public technology 
procurement, or incubation activities can mitigate such problems. 
• There is empirical evidence that suggests that large-scale and radical 
technological shifts rarely take place without the support of public 
intervention – not even in the USA (as opposed to incremental innovation 
in established sectors). Carlsson and Jacobsson (1997) have shown this for 
technological breakthroughs in electronics, semiconductors, and genetic 
engineering in the United States and Sweden. Mowery (2005) has shown 
that publicly funded R&D in combination with public technology 
procurement has played a crucial role in developing new high-tech SSIs in 
the United States (and thereby in the world). Examples are computer 
hardware, computer software, large aircrafts, biotechnology and the 
Internet 
• A small intervention at an early stage in an innovati n process can have a 
very large effect. The NMT 450 mobile telephony stand rd is an example. 
A large intervention at a mature stage often has a very small effect. (An 
example was the Swedish public support to the shipyard industry in the 
1970s and 1980s. The support for NMT 450 was a couple of hundred man-
years and led to the emergence of a global industry, where Nordic firms 
are leading. The support to the shipyard industry absorbed 0.5 percent of 
the Swedish GDP over a 10-year period, but did not have any lasting 
results. The difficult thing is to “pick and support winners”, but avoid 
“supporting losers” (in terms of sectors, technologies, and products). Still, 
this is the challenge for innovation policy – as well as for firm strategy. 
Thus, lobbyism often seems to work for an innovation p licy that should not be 
pursued. Instead the support should be channelled to operations and sectors where risk 
and uncertainty are largest. Innovation policy should play the role of a midwife – not 
provide support towards the end of life. This requires that policy-makers and politicians 
have a sophisticated analysis at their disposal, as well as a high degree of integrity, to 
counter-balance lobbyism. 
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Arguably, changing the structure of production and altering technological 
trajectories are among the most formidable policy challenges facing NSIs, given that 
when uncertainty and risk are high, the danger that markets will under-perform relative to 
public policy objectives is particularly great. For example, private actors might under-
invest in basic R&D (Arrow 1962) or they might not invest at all in activities of great 
social return but low individual return (e.g., some drugs). High uncertainty might also 
prevent the emergence of innovations.  
 
 
3. Comparing NSIs in the Ten Countries Project 
In the literature on SIs, there has been an ongoing te sion between, on one hand, 
demands for a more structured conceptual framework that would  facilitate systematic 
comparisons and, on the other hand, insistence on recognizing the unique character of  
individual SIs. The first position is well represent d, for example, in various 
contributions on ‘benchmarking’ by Niosi and colleagues (Niosi 2002; Niosi et al. 1993; 
Niosi and Bellon 1994), and it has also been adopted by the OECD (1997). The second 
position has been championed by, among others, Miettenin (2002) who argues for a more 
contextually oriented approach to describing SIs, based on the principles of historicity, 
industrial specificity and geographical specificity. The NSI literature has not yet fully 
satisfied either set of expectations, as NSI proponents admit (Lundvall 1999). 
In the Ten Countries Project, we tried to strike a balance between these opposing 
views of how to study NSIs. On one hand, we paid close attention to basic statistics (on, 
e.g., educational attainment of the labour force, industrial structure, and globalisation) 
and performance indicators for growth, scientific activity (publication), patenting, and 
innovation. CIS II data was used extensively in descriptions of the European NSIs, and 
parallel data sets were used for their Asian counterparts. In addition to work on 
indicators, we also followed a common format for describing the ten NSIs, based largely 
on the ‘activities’ framework presented above, as well as including sections  on 
‘globalisation’ and the economic consequences of innovation for ecnomic growth. On 
the other hand, however, we required each national study to take the NSI’s historical 
background into full account, and we also asked for an assessment of the NSI’s particular 
strengths and weaknesses, as well as its past accomplish ents and future challenges in 
innovation policy. Perhaps most importantly, we encouraged contributors to identify for 
each NSI a central issue, problem, or paradox that illuminated its essential character – 
and these provide central themes in each of the country chapters. 
In operationalising the ‘activities’ framework presented in the foregoing section, 
we were determined to avoid ‘naïve benchmarking’ – i.e., ranking the performance of 
countries on a set of indicators, while disregarding e tirely the ‘systemic’ element in the 
systems of innovation concept (Lundvall and Tomlinson 2002). Instead, we followed 
what has been called a ‘case-based’ approach to making international comparisons. This 
approach develops a central focus on contexts and ptterns, in order to provide a basis for 
generating causal analyses (Ragin 1987). Essentially, the analysis first draws out patterns 
from within cases, and then compares these patterns. To use somewhat different 
terminology, ‘cross-case’ analysis is preceded – and informed – by ‘within-case’ analysis, 
and both types of analysis focus on causal relationships. 
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Prior to focussing on the identification and comparison of patterns, we 
systematically mapped national contexts. We began with a detailed overview of 
economic performance over time, focussing on growth profiles, the processes and 
mechanisms by which economic growth had been achieved, and the linkages between 
growth and innovation. We also addressed globalization and its implications for 
innovation as another important contextual dimension. Subsequently, we examined the 
performance of NSIs. We used comparative patenting data indicating historical changes 
in revealed technological advantage (RTA) to distingu sh between countries that had 
diversified their technological profiles, and countries that had not. Thus, our mapping of 
national contexts yielded two key dichotomies – ‘fast’ vs. ‘slow’ growth and ‘broadening’ 
vs. ‘deepening’ technology profiles -- to describe broad patterns of change over time. By 
combining these dichotomies into a four-fold matrix, we were able to classify the ten 
countries into four main groups, as will later be discussed in relation to Table 2, below. 
To identify and compare patterns, we grouped our ten activities into four broad 
categories: ‘knowledge inputs’ (R&D and competence building), ‘demand-side activities’ 
(market creation and articulation of quality requirements), ‘constituents of innovation 
systems’ (generation of organizations, networks, and institutions), and ‘support for 
innovating firms’ (incubation, financing and consultancy services). We further combined 
these four categories into two main axes of activity: one corresponded to ‘knowledge 
inputs’ vs. ‘demand-side activities’, and the other to ‘constituents’ vs. ‘support for 
innovating firms’. These procedures provided a compass that could be used to chart the 
occurrence of problems of inconsistency – imbalance, mismatch, or tension – in two 
main dimensions of activity that are fundamental for systems of innovation. The first 
dimension features the problematic of supply vs. demand that is conventional to standard 
economics and fundamental to the policy discourse of ‘market failure’. The second is 
associated with the evolutionary economics problematic of diversity creation and the 
alternative discourse on institutional and organisation l ‘system failure’. By mapping the 
occurrence of what we have called innovation policy ‘problems’ in relation to these two 
axes, and by investigating their causes in terms of relationships among activities on both 
axes, we identified patterns that lent themselves to comparative analysis.  
 
 
4. Grouping NSIs by Growth and Technology Development 
In this section, we discuss how we arrived at an initial grouping of the ten NSIs, 
based on performance indicators compiled for the Ten Countries Project – particularly 
indicators for growth and technology development. First, we discuss the countries’ 
growth profiles. Subsequently, we address their records with respect to technology 
development. Finally, we present a four-fold classification of the ten NSIs. 
 
4.1. Patterns of Growth 
Our study was especially concerned with the patterns of growth for these 
countries during more recent decades, and it is therefore appropriate here to characterize 
the countries according to their growth patterns over the past 30 years – i.e.,  from 1975 
to 2005. Patterns of economic growth related to the ten NSIs are shown in Figure 1, 
below. The figure, which depicts growth in GDP per capita over the 1975 – 2005 period, 
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shows a clear separation between two groups of countries, with regard to their growth 
patterns. 
We can thus distinguish between a first group of five countries marked by ‘slow 
growth’ and a second group of five countries that have exhibited ‘fast growth’. The first, 
‘slow growth’ group includes the countries of Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, and Sweden. The second, ‘fast growth’ group includes the countries of Hong 
Kong, Ireland, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan.  This grouping of the ten countries is 
neither surprising nor controversial, corresponding as it does to the well-known 
distinction between ‘catching up’ economies and those that are either ‘falling behind’ or 
risk doing so (Abramowitz 1986, 1994). In fairness to the first group of ‘slow growth’ 
countries, though, they generally appear to have ben holding and in some cases 
improving their positions in recent years, rather than losing ground.  
Our findings concerning the ten countries’ growth patterns do not bring into 
question accepted explanations of differential rates of economic growth, though they may 
provide more support for some theories than for others.  For example, the fact that all of 
the fast growth countries, despite their long histor es, have undergone profound ‘regime 
change’ during the 20th century, through upheavals such as revolution, civil war, and de-
colonization, may support the thesis that economic growth is best promoted by the 
removal of inhibitory political institutions protecting the vested interests of traditional 
ruling elites (Jones 2003).The various national studies served to highlight, with respect to 
‘fast growth’ countries, that entry into the same ‘growth sector’ (the electronics and ICT 
industries) can be achieved by very different means. With regard to ‘slow growth’ 
countries, the national studies showed that slow growth can be coupled with very 
different sectoral specializations and technological trajectories. 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
 
 
4.2. Technology Development  
With respect to technology development, a clear division can be made amongst 
the ten countries in terms of change in the direction of inventive activity over time. This 
division, moreover, cuts across the previously discus ed categories of ‘fast growth’ and 
‘slow growth’ countries.  
To capture the direction of inventive activity over time, we constructed statistical 
profiles indicating historical change in patterns of revealed technological advantage 
(RTA), measured in terms of  patenting activity occurring during the period from 1980 to 
2001 (Bitard et al. 2006: Figure 3.2).9  These ‘technology profiles’ covered eight of the 
ten countries, excluding only Hong Kong and Singapore. They were examined in terms 
of whether or not patenting activity over the whole p riod had maintained the same 
                                               
9 These profiles were originally produced as an adden um to the following ‘indicator report’ for the project: 
Wang, K. Tsai, M.-T.,  Luo, I Y.-L.,  Balaguer, A.,  Hung, S.-C.,  Wu, F.-S., Hsu, M.-Y., and Chu, Y.-Y. 
2003. Intensities of scientific performance: Publication and citation at a macro and sectoral level of nine 
countries. Working Paper. Science and Technology Information Centre – National Science Council. Taipei, 
Republic of China. 
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pattern of specialization as indicated for the first sub-period, from 1980 to 1986, or 
developed new areas of specialization in more recent sub-periods.  
On this basis, we were able to divide the national technology profiles into two 
distinct groups. One on hand, there is a group of countries that have significantly 
‘broadened’ their technological profiles: Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Taiwan. 
Although they are not covered by the ‘t chnology profiles’, other evidence from the 
country reports indicate that Hong Kong and Singapore should also be included in this 
group, due to their recent initiatives to develop dmestic biotechnology industries. On the 
other hand, there is a group of countries that have either maintained their earlier patterns 
of specialization or narrowed them: Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, and South Korea. 
 
4.3. Patterns of Change over Time in NSIs  
By combining the distinction between countries that d either ‘broadened’ or 
‘maintained/narrowed’ their technological profiles with the previously discussed 
distinction between ‘fast growth’ and ‘slow growth’ countries, we were able to sort the ten 
NSIs into four main groups. These groups are shown in Table 2, below.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Grouping the NSIs according to these two sets of categories enabled us to specify 
four distinctive patterns of recent historical change among the countries. The summary 
account of the national studies that follows in the next section is organised according to 
this scheme.  
 
5. Patterns of Activity in NSIs 
In the following section, we provide brief accounts of the patterns of activity 
characteristic of the four groups into which the ten NSIs were divided, as discussed 
above. We are unable to provide detailed and comprehensive accounts of all ten cases, 
and therefore rely on brief summaries of the nationl studies prepared for the Ten 
Countries Project. For each cell of the four-fold matrix illustrated in Table 2, we describe 
and analyze the pattern of activity within NSIs, refe ring to two main axes of activity: 
‘knowledge inputs’ - ‘demand-side activities’, and ‘constituents’ - ‘support for innovating 
firms’. Due to space limitations, the discussion here does n t address all the NSIs equally 
but focuses on selected cases. Sweden is treated as a le ding example of a ‘slow growth’ 
country that has broadened its technological profile, and Taiwan as its ‘fast growth’ 
counterpart. Among countries that have instead deepened their technological profiles, 
The Netherlands represents ‘slow growth’ countries and Korea ‘fast growth’ countries. 
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5.1. Technology Broadening and Slow Growth: Sweden, Norway and Finland 
Sweden, like Finland and Norway, has successfully broadened its technological 
profile under – and in response to -- conditions of slow growth. Of all these countries, 
however, Sweden may have made the least progress in technological diversification. 
Recent and fairly dramatic Swedish advances in Telecommunications and other fields 
such as Medical Electronics actually extend earlier specialization patterns and only 
appear to be ‘new’ from a longer-term perspective. In contrast, Finland’s breakthrough in 
Telecommunications is much more recent, as is Norway’s rapid progress in Medical 
Electronics. Of all three countries, however, Sweden retains the broadest overall profile. 
Sweden has experienced an ongoing imbalance between the supply of and 
demand for innovations or innovation inputs, particularly R&D. The ‘Swedish paradox’ 
refers essentially to low pay-off in terms of new products from very large investments in 
R&D and innovation. This problem can be attributed o several causes: globalization 
resulting in commercialization of Swedish innovations abroad, ineffective technology 
transfer from research organizations to commercial application by firms, and a sectoral 
allocation of R&D investment favouring industries with low innovation intensity. The 
dominance of incumbent large firms (MNCs) is a common thread in all these lines of 
explanation.  
Sweden’s extensive support for innovating firms and entrepreneurial start-ups has 
resulted in only modest rates of new firm creation a d only moderate success in 
strengthening specialization in fast growing ‘high tech’ industries. New firm creation and 
inter-firm networking remain dominated by large firms, and institutional arrangements 
(in e.g., labour markets and taxation) also sustain the dominance of large firms, many of 
them based in industries with low innovation intensity. There is considerable lack of fit 
between ‘constituents’ and ‘support’, such that the ultimate beneficiaries of the latter 
appear to be those least in need. The overall pattern of evolution in Sweden is one of 
gradual tradition from an innovation system dominated by large mechanical engineering 
firms to one in which science-based and information-intensive sectors will feature more 
prominently, but large incumbent firms are unlikely to be displaced by new entrants.  
Similar dynamics can be observed in the other two countries.  Norway exhibits 
little entrepreneurship in science-based and information-intensive sectors. Thus, 
extensive provision of support for innovating firms has brought poor results, due to the 
restrictive investment climate and structural rigidity bred by the dominance of large firms 
in the resource-extraction and transportation servic s sectors. In Finland, public-sector 
support for innovation, networking arrangements, and institutional reforms have been 
geared mainly to the successful development and interna ionalization of large firms such 
as Nokia. Entrepreneurial small firms have been much less well provided for. 
 
5.2. Technology Broadening and Fast Growth Taiwan (Si gapore and Hong Kong) 
Taiwan is our leading example of a country that hasbroadened its technology 
profile under conditions of - or leading to - rapid economic growth. Indeed, it may be the 
only verifiable example, given the lack of corresponding data on the apparently similar 
cases of Singapore and Hong Kong. In Taiwan, broadening has occurred primarily 
through dramatically increased patenting in the field of Semiconductors and Electronics. 
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As in the Swedish case, though, Taiwan has been active in this field for some time, and it 
is only from a very long-term perspective that it constitutes a ‘new’ specialization.  
Taiwan’s rising rate of investment in R&D has been characterized by the fast 
growth of business expenditure on R&D and a dramatic increase in patenting.  Similarly, 
the strong expansion of Taiwanese post-secondary education has increasingly focused on 
ICT-related scientific, engineering and technical skills. Balance between supply and 
demand has obtained, since these developments have been driven by the upgrading of 
firms in high-tech manufacturing sectors. These firms excel in production for high tech 
markets, drawing their competitive advantage from manufacturing and process 
innovation skills. 
As it reaches the limits of factory automation and the adoption of advanced 
production techniques as a competitive strategy, thoug , Taiwan now confronts 
mismatches on the ‘constituents-support’ axis. These issues reflect the need of existing 
firms to diversify, through product innovation based on independent scientific and 
engineering capabilities. For Taiwanese firms to break out of the trajectory that they have 
established for themselves as technology  followers and ‘second movers’, it has become 
necessary to reform existing  institutions for protection of intellectual property and 
develop forms of R&D collaboration that facilitate appropriation of innovation.  
Similar patterns emerge in the cases of Singapore and Hong Kong, both of which 
have recently diversified their pattern of innovatie activity by investing in the emerging 
field of biotechnology. In Singapore, recent increas s in indigenous R&D within targeted 
fields of science and technology have not been matched by the commercialization of 
indigenous intellectual property in corresponding sectors -- especially on the part of 
entrepreneurial high-tech start-up firms. Historically Singapore has concentrated on 
developing labour force competencies and skills, and its main R&D inputs have come 
from technology-intensive foreign MNCs with local operations. Singapore has 
successfully reconfigured public and private innovation capabilities several times over 
the past decades, through institutional reforms and changes in the provision of support to 
innovating firms. However, there has been little recent private-sector response to the 
current build-up of support services targeting entrpreneurial high-tech SMES. Prospects 
for developing indigenous R&D and innovation capability remain uncertain, and 
technological entrepreneurship in strategic sectors remains low, due to cultural factors 
(risk aversion), gaps in institutions and organizations (a lack of mechanisms ‘bridging’ 
R&D and seed investment) and the conservatism natural to a small domestic market. In 
Hong Kong, support for innovating firms largely reinforces the dominant producer 
services trajectory by developing consultancy servic s and financing ICT projects, but 
incubation targets the nascent biotechnology industry. This divided focus indicates 
possible future tension and conflict between established and emerging industries. All 
three cases reveal the difficulties of diversification in the face of path dependency. 
 
5.3. Technology Maintaining and Slow Growth: The Netherlands and Denmark 
In the Netherlands, unlike Sweden, there has been no significant broadening of 
the country’s technological profile in recent years, and both advances and retreats in 
patenting have occurred only in areas of specialization that were established at an early 
point. Recently, the strongest advances have occurred in the fields of Food and Tobacco, 
Biotechnology, and Medical Electronics, all of whic were already areas of strength for 
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the Netherlands in the early- to mid-1980s.  A similar pattern obtains in Denmark, 
perhaps most notably in the fields of Food and Tobacco and Biotechnology. 
In the Netherlands, despite very high performance with respect to knowledge 
inputs, innovative activity has levelled off and private sector R&D has begun to decline, 
at least in relative terms, implying diminishing demand for these inputs. A pattern of 
sectoral specialization that de-emphasizes manufacturing, together with globalization 
effects, makes it difficult to improve system performance simply by increasing 
knowledge inputs. Instead, balancing supply and demand requires the Netherlands to gear 
inputs to emerging growth sectors.  
The problems encountered in the Netherlands include low levels of 
entrepreneurship and inadequate interaction between universities and other public 
research organizations and private sector actors, reflected in low levels of knowledge 
transfer and research commercialization.  The overall pattern is one of an impasse bred 
by ‘lock-in’ to institutional and organizational arrangements that serve incumbent firms in 
declining (or de-industrializing) sectors better than ‘new entrants’ in emerging sectors. 
The Netherlands NSI appears to be a ‘dual system’. The universities, most research 
institutes, and many public research organizations cater primarily to large incumbent 
firms, well established but declining industries, and ‘relatively old’ technological fields. 
In contrast, only a few organizations provide inputs to new firms, industries, and 
technologies. Also, creation of new firms, industries, and technological innovation 
platforms is often poorly coordinated with corresponding forms of support, some of 
which are inadequately funded. 
Denmark, like the Netherlands, has maintained essentially the same technological 
profile over the past two or more decades. Its current transition towards a more mixed 
mode of innovation combining a science and technology driven mode with the traditional 
mode based on doing, using, and interacting has so far not entailed any major disruptions.  
Against this background, recent policy appears to have led in a potentially disruptive 
direction that may actually become problematic, depending on the strength and focus of 
initiatives to bring about structural change through efforts to strengthen high technology 
sectors by promoting university-industry interaction and the creation of science-based 
firms and industries. However, policy makers could argue that Denmark’s flagging 
growth rate makes it imperative to step up these efforts and thereby break with tradition. 
 
5.4. Technology Maintaining and Fast Growth: Korea and Ireland 
Korea stands out among the ‘fast growth’ countries as an example of technology 
deepening that has also involved a narrowing of the country’s technological profile over 
time. Korea’s profile in the 1980-86 sub-period was much broader than in the 1994 – 
2001 sub-period. Similar changes have occurred in Ireland, but not to the same degree. 
Korea, like Taiwan, has a history of developing theechnological capabilities of 
its own large firms. Similar to other ‘catching up’ economies, Korea has matched supply- 
and demand-side activities by utilizing imported technology to support a strong 
specialization in rapidly growing export markets, ep cially for ‘high tech’ products. 
Increasing globalization of both production and R&D by major Korean firms has meant, 
however, that efforts to upgrade domestic knowledge inputs will have to be coordinated 
with initiatives to strengthen the absorptive capacity and innovative capabilities of small 
domestic suppliers to these large firms. 
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Liberalization and efforts to promote a more entrepreneurial economy in Korea 
have been fairly recent developments.  Despite regulatory reforms and the reorganization 
or creation of support functions suitable to new venture businesses, the economy 
continues to be dominated by large conglomerates. The chaebols have adapted poorly to 
liberalization and continue to constrain innovation networks, in particular. Thus, a 
mismatch of organizations and institutions frustrates support for innovating firms. 
Generally, the Korean NSI is experiencing a difficult transition from large firm 
dominance and top-down government steering to entrepren urship, open competition, 
and more interactive partnerships between government and industrial actors. In both the 
‘old’ and the ‘new’ versions of the Korean NSI, small domestic firms have tended to be 
disadvantaged, but the latter benefits new venture businesses while threatening more 
traditional SMEs. 
A similar problem arises in Ireland, albeit in relation to foreign, rather than 
domestic MNCs. In activities related to ‘constituents’ and ‘support’, the Irish NSI has, on 
one hand, bolstered inward investment by embedding foreign MNCs within local or 
regional clusters of inter-related firms, and, on the other, promoted the formation of new 
firms, the development of innovative capabilities, and  effective innovation networks 
within indigenous industries. Success in the latter type of effort appears to have depended 
greatly on the degree to which there has been a significant overlap with the former type. 
The predominance of foreign MNCs has ensured high overall consistency in Ireland’s 
NSI, such that its main strengths are based on aligments of different kinds of activities 
that support this industrial order. Thus, e.g., foreign MNCs based in Ireland constitute 
important sources of demand for indigenous firms, whose innovation and growth 
performance has been improved by vertical linkage with them. Small indigenous firms in 
traditional industries outside this virtuous circle remain the NSI’s weakest components. 
 
 
6. Comparative Analysis  
In this section we relate the foregoing overview of the ten NSIs to the theoretical 
and practical issues that we raised at the outset (in Section 2). The main theoretical issue, 
related to the different perspectives advanced by ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ definitions of NSIs,  
concerned the character and coherence of NSIs – i.e., the question of whether or not they 
exhibit truly ‘systemic’ properties, even in the context of increasing globalization. 
Practical issues included both the requirements of comparative research on NSIs and 
policy questions, particularly the debate on non-selective versus selective measures. The 
discussion below focuses on primarily on policy issues. However, it also seeks to 
demonstrate the utility of an ‘activities’ approach for comparative research on SIs.   
 
6.1. NSI Coherence under Globalisation 
We begin by returning to our original point of departure, the concept of NSIs. As 
noted at the outset, there has been ongoing, albeit understated, rivalry between ‘broad’ 
and ‘narrow’ conceptions of NSIs. In addition to defining NSIs differently, they expressed 
fundamental differences of opinion concerning the int grity of NSIs.  Representing the 
broad approach, Lundvall (1992) argued that NSIs would continue to pursue distinctive 
national trajectories, even under the homogenizing influence of globalization processes. 
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The narrow approach implicitly questioned this positi n, based on Nelson’s (1992) view 
that NSIs could largely be reduced to ensembles of sectoral systems of innovation (SSIs). 
On these questions, evidence from the ten countries investigated in this project 
generally favours the ‘broad’ perspective on NSIs, rather than the ‘narrow’ one. The 
national studies have shown that although economic growth can be based on different 
patterns of sectoral specialization and trajectories of technology development, most 
countries have moved, or attempted to move, in the direction of greater specialization in 
rapidly expanding ‘high technology’ sectors, in order to achieve or maintain high rates of 
economic growth.10 However, examination of the countries that have been most 
successful in this endeavour – i.e., the ‘fast growth’ countries – reveals that their 
respective entries into (in almost all cases) the same ‘high-tech’ sector (i.e., electronics) 
have been accomplished through very different strategies and mechanisms. Some, like 
Korea and Taiwan, have focused on developing domestic firms capable of competing in 
the global market, whereas others, like Ireland and(until recently) Singapore, have 
focused mainly on attracting foreign MNCs and promoting ‘innovation by invitation’.  
Further, the evidence on globalization effects reveals a growing diversity in the 
technological trajectories that both ‘fast growth’ and ‘slow growth’ countries have chosen 
to pursue, even within the same sectors. In ICT manufacturing, for example, Sweden has 
increasingly become a centre for R&D, whereas Taiwan h s mastered and refined 
sophisticated production technologies and Hong Kong has focused on co-ordination, 
adding high-value-added services to regionally based international production networks. 
Both Denmark and The Netherlands have developed strengths in biotechnology, but 
while the former has benefited from international col aboration, the latter has experienced 
diminishing returns. Rather than converging, the NSIs in our study have established 
distinctive roles within an increasingly differentiated international division of labour. 
Moreover, these roles tend to be consistent across sectors, as demonstrated by the cases 
of countries as widely different as Sweden and Hong Kong. Thus there is considerable 
evidence to indicate that globalization does not erd  NSIs or render them incoherent. 
 
6.2. An ‘Activities-based’ Perspective on Policy in NSIs:  Problems and Strategies 
We now turn to policy issues, which we initially discussed in Section 2. 
Following our more general argument that our proposed ‘activities’ framework facilitates 
the comparative study of NSIs by circumventing the problem of ‘functional equivalence’, 
we argued more specifically that this framework provides an especially useful point of 
entry into policy analysis. Following this approach, we can identify the organisations 
performing the activities and examine the relations among them, focussing on the 
division of labour between private and public organis tions and trying to determine 
whether it is justified or not. This kind of analysis, we explained, requires the 
specification of policy ‘problems’ and the assessment of organisational problem-solving 
capabilities.  Further, we pointed out that conventional (or mainstream economics) and 
systemic approaches to innovation policy differ not only in how they define policy 
problems – i.e., ‘market failures’ in the former approach and ‘system failures’ in the latter 
– but also in their strategies for solving such problems. The conventional mainstream 
economics approach recommends ‘non-selective’ strategies that address framework 
                                               
10 Here, specialization is measured in terms of change i  production structure, not in terms of patenting.  
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conditions, whereas the systemic approach promotes more ‘selective’ strategies focused 
on particular linkages within a given NSI.  
Our discussion of analytical procedures in Section 3 outlined how the occurrence 
of policy problems could be mapped onto two main axes or dimensions of essential 
activities in NSIs: The first axis of ‘knowledge inputs’ and ‘demand-side’ activities 
highlights problems of supply and demand, which canbe conceptualized as ‘market 
failures’. The second axis of ‘constituents’ and ‘support for innovating firms’ features 
institutional and organizational problems that can be thought of as ‘system failures. We 
used this scheme to identify and compare the occurrence of policy problems in NSIs 
For most of the countries in our study, the most intractable problems of 
innovation policy took the form of issues arising on the axis of activities concerned with 
the ‘constituents’ of innovation systems and the provision of ‘support for innovating 
firms’. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that market forces – or public interventions 
aimed at clearly identifiable market failures -- can be expected to achieve or restore 
balance along the other main axis of ‘knowledge inputs’ and ‘demand-side’ activities. 
Mainstream economists have been fairly successful in identifying specific policy 
instruments that can be used to address ‘market failures’, whereas proponents of the 
alternative, systemic approach have not made  similar progress in specifying instruments 
to address  ‘system failures’ (Mytelka and Smith 2002). 
A perhaps more surprising observation is that in those countries where serious 
mismatches or inconsistencies do arise on the  axisof ‘knowledge inputs’ and ‘demand-
side’ activities, they can be traced to causal factors as ociated with the axis of 
‘constituents’ and ‘support for innovating firms’. This finding indicates that the main 
challenge facing NSIs is that of creating diversity – i.e., escaping ‘lock-in’ into well-
established production specializations and technological trajectories by launching new 
alternatives.  In contrast, the more familiar problems of providing adequate factor inputs 
and ensuring competitive ‘framework conditions’ appear to be issues whose solution is 
much easier. These considerations lead, in turn, to arguments for selective innovation 
policies, which in contrast to ‘framework’ policies, are more closely associated with 
‘system failures’. 
Returning to the most problematic cases among the ‘slow growth’ countries, the 
evidence from both Sweden and the Netherlands supports a critique of non-selective 
policies. Historically, Swedish innovation policies have reinforced the dominance of 
large firms and industries characterized by low innovation intensity, and have also 
supported high levels of investment in education and R&D. More recent policies have 
emphasized providing support to start-up firms in science-based sectors, but other ‘non-
selective’ reforms have promoted the globalization of Sweden’s major industrial firms 
while maintaining their dominant position within the national economy. New firms and 
new industries have therefore developed slowly, on terms favourable to incumbent actors. 
In the Netherlands, past and present policies, directed towards increased competition, on 
one hand, and higher levels of public-private interaction, on the other, seem too broadly 
framed to accomplish a fundamental reorientation of the NSI. The main question 
concerning interaction in the Netherlands NSI, e.g., is arguably not one of ‘how much’? 
but rather ‘what kind’? Non-selective policies that overlook such issues ar  liable simply 
to reproduce the existing system and perhaps also erode its main strengths. 
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Strong support for the necessity of selective policies – and also clear indications 
of the problems entailed in developing and implementing them – emerges from the most 
problematic cases among ‘fast growth countries. Korea exemplifies the limitations of 
policies addressing ‘the market’ in general. Liberalization was a necessary response to the 
financial crisis of the 1990s, and involved the introduction of reforms that were both 
wide-ranging and comprehensive. However, Korean policy-makers apparently 
underestimated the difficulties of implementation, as evidenced, e.g., by the relative 
underdevelopment of new arrangements for financing in ovation.  Further, continuing 
problems with the output and organization of both public education and public sector 
R&D indicate that the extent and pace of reform have not been sufficient and may need to 
be redoubled in certain areas. The Taiwanese case illu trates the difficulty of designing 
selective policies. Historically, Taiwan’s innovation policies have succeeded in fostering 
competitive OEM/ODM firms in ICT manufacturing. Many aspects of the NSI have been 
geared to this effort  – e.g., the public sector’s role in building competences in strategic 
areas through a variety of mechanisms for technology diffusion and learning. However, 
the past achievements of Taiwanese innovation policy have also contributed to current 
problems of lock-in, and policymakers now face the c allenges of developing stronger 
indigenous R&D capabilities and strengthening the IPRs of domestic firms. 
The cases cited above are not exceptional, insofar as similar findings occur in 
other national studies. For instance, the Norwegian case supports the same conclusions as 
the studies of Sweden and the Netherlands, and the Singaporean case develops insights 
similar to those articulated in relation to Taiwan. I  Norway, past innovation policies 
were directed towards breaking out of the existing pattern of industrial and technological 
specialization by focusing on selected science-based nd information-intensive industries, 
and corresponding research fields. However, these policies were not supported by 
accompanying reforms in areas such as taxation, and they were also undermined by an 
economic downturn during the early 1990s. More recent innovation policy has shifted 
towards a non-selective approach that implicitly favours established sectors and 
incumbent firms, especially in terms of support forR&D. In the case of Singapore, 
innovation policies have evolved with the NSI, typically leading its development. 
However, the achievements of past policies for ‘MNC-leveraging economic development’ 
may have reduced policymakers’ scope of action in recent efforts to build up indigenous 
innovation capabilities. Although the policy shift towards investment in R&D has had a 
positive impact on R&D intensity and innovative performance, policies geared towards 
promoting high-tech entrepreneurship have not enjoyed similar success thus far. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The findings discussed in the foregoing section point to the fundamental 
importance of path-dependent processes of co-evolution – i.e., “mutual expansion of 
complementary social institutions” via coalescence around “national specificities in 
organizing principles” (Dosi and Kogut 1993: 253, 258) -- in the ongoing development of 
NSIs. The innovation studies literature has mainly discussed co-evolution in terms of 
interaction among the variables of technology, industrial structure, institutions, and 
demand (Nelson 1994; Metcalfe 1998), but has lately sought to develop more finely-
grained accounts of how various elements of a system of innovation develop over time 
through mutual adaptation (Malerba 2004: 30). Arguably, the ‘activities’ approach that we 
 20 
have followed in describing and analyzing the ‘small economy’ NSIs in the Ten Countries 
Project is particularly well suited to this purpose. Unlike other approaches to the study of 
innovation systems, which typically focus on elements, actors, and structures, the 
activities approach directs attention towards the fundamental mechanisms and processes 
by which systems of innovation are constituted and change over time, given that “social 
systems [must] temporalize their elements as action-events” (Luhmann 1995: 293).  
We do not claim to have produced a definitive account of co-evolution in NSIs 
within the Ten Countries Project, but merely to have indicated its fundamental 
importance. As we shall now discuss, that importance is nowhere more evident than in 
relation to the design of innovation policy.  At the system level, innovation policy 
informed by an evolutionary perspective entails attempting to assess, influence, and lead 
(i.e., co-ordinate) complex processes of change and development, rather than trying to 
“impose predetermined outcomes” with a focus on individual innovations (Metcalfe 1995: 
31). On one hand, as we have argued, this requires a selective approach; on the other, it 
demands grasping the dynamics of co-evolution and key complementarities among 
different aspects of an NSI. 
In all ten of the NSIs covered by this study, policymakers have, without 
exception, proclaimed the adoption of the ‘systems of innovation’ approach as a 
framework and guide for future innovation policy. As already noted, however, there are 
widely differing views within the policy-making comunity on what ‘innovation policy’ 
consists of, and the same might also be said of the syst ms of innovation approach, which 
is often used “more as a label than an analytical tool” (Edquist 2005: 202). Certainly, 
there are often wide discrepancies in policy between the rhetorical and practical 
expressions of a systems of innovation approach. This point is strikingly demonstrated by 
the case of Norway. Norway currently faces “the issue of deciding between a broad 
approach versus a more targeted approach” (Grønning et al. 2006: Section 7.3). 
Implicitly, the ‘broad’ approach appears to invoke the systems of innovation concept in 
calling for a ‘holistic’ policy framework. However, it remains vague as to pecific policy 
measures, expresses an underlying philosophy of ‘general upgrading’, avoids setting 
priorities, and reverts at least partially to a linear view of the innovation process. All of 
this is highly incompatible with a systems of innovation approach, as demonstrated by the 
Norwegian study (ibid.), which incorporates a critial analysis informed by a systemic 
perspective that proposes a much more ‘targeted’ kind of innovation policy for Norway. 
In developing a ‘performative’ perspective on organizational change, Feldman 
(2003: 749) has argued that “it is difficult to bring about change in organizational routines 
when the change is inconsistent with broader understandings about how the organization 
operates as these understandings are produced and reproduced by other performances in 
the organization”. The activities-based approach applied in this comparative study of 
national systems of innovation leads to similar conclusions about the importance of 
achieving consistency at the system level. The success of specific policy measures aimed 
at changing particular activities, or sets of activities, within a system of innovation 
usually depends on simultaneous adjustments to complementary or related sets of 
activities within the system. The discussion in the foregoing section has cited numerous 
examples to this effect, and here we confine ourselve  to just one more. In Denmark, 
where ‘low-tech’ activities predominate and a large population of SMEs has only weak 
networking linkages with the universities, “policies aiming at bringing the national 
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system ‘to the very top’ in this dimension might not necessarily strengthen the system as a 
whole”; other technology transfer strategies “such as life-long learning” may be more 
effective in strengthening the innovative capabilities of many firms and sectors 
(Christensen, et al. 2006: Section 7). More generally, the Danish study shows that 
policies aimed at promoting a transition to a ‘science-based’ mode of innovation are 
unlikely to succeed in Denmark without taking into account the wider socio-economic 
setting and other factors contributing to the successful operation of the Danish model. 
Of course, achieving perfect consistency within systems of innovation should 
never be regarded as an end in itself, since that would be tantamount to the pursuit of 
inertia. Our study abounds with examples of countries that have excelled in specialising 
in certain sectors, technologies, forms of business organisation, and modes of innovation, 
to the extent that further incremental progress along these well-established trajectories 
would be for them the path of least resistance, attnded by little or no disruption at the 
system level. However, as these same examples indicate, this kind of balance or harmony 
within a system of innovation may actually be cause for alarm, since it is symptomatic of 
‘lock-in’ to pathways whose potential for generating economic welfare may soon be 
exhausted. Taiwan may have achieved world-class mastery in ICT manufacturing, but 
now faces strong competitive pressures to develop the innovative capabilities of 
Taiwanese firms in the areas of product innovation, design, marketing and distribution. 
Finland may have accomplished a successful large firm-led entry into a key high-
technology sector, but remains highly vulnerable in terms of both excessive dependency 
on electronics and the preponderance of one large, multi-national firm. In both NSIs, 
change is imperative. 
Rather than minimizing systemic change, the proper task of innovation policy 
should be to channel it in the most potentially rewarding directions. Innovation systems, 
like other systems, evolve by resolving problems of inconsistency – systemic tensions, 
mismatches, or imbalances -- and innovation policy directed towards achieving 
fundamental systemic change often requires introducing such problems into the system of 
innovation, usually through specific policy measure aimed at altering particular aspects, 
or sets of activities, within the system. However, policy-makers should not be so naïve as 
to expect that these initiatives are liable to succeed in the absence of accompanying 
adjustments to complementary or related aspects, or areas of activity. This kind of 
balancing act, moreover, may be easier to accomplish at the earlier stages of system 
development.  As systems evolve over time towards geater complexity, they may afford 
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Key activities in systems of innovation 
  
I.          Provision of knowledge inputs to the innovation process 
 
1. Provision of R&D and, thus, creation of new knowledge, primarily in e gineering, 
medicine and natural sciences. 
 
2. Competence building: educating and training the labour force for innovation and R&D 
activities.  
 
II. Demand-side activities  
 
3. Formation of new product markets. 
 
4. Articulation of quality requirements emanating from the demand side with regard to new 
products. 
 
III. Provision of constituents for SIs 
 
5. Creating and changing organisations needed for developing new fields of innovation. 
Examples include enhancing entrepreneurship to create new firms and intrapreneurship to 
diversify existing firms; and creating new research organisations, policy agencies, etc. 
 
6. Networking through markets and other mechanisms, including interactive learning 
between different organisations (potentially) involved in the innovation processes. This 
implies integrating new knowledge elements developed in different spheres of the SI and 
coming from outside with elements already available in the innovating firms.  
 
7. Creating and changing institutions – e.g., patent laws, tax laws, environment and safety 
regulations, R&D investment routines, etc. – that influence innovating organisations and 
innovation processes by providing incentives for and removing obstacles to innovation. 
 
IV. Support services for innovating firms 
 
8. Incubation activities such as providing access to facilities and administrat ve support for 
innovating efforts. 
 
9. Finance of innovation processes and other activities that can facilitate commercialisation 
of knowledge and its adoption. 
 
10. Provision of consultancy services relevant for innovation processes, e.g., technology 
transfer, commercial information, and legal advice. 
 
Source: Edquist (2005) 
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Table 2 
Patterns of Recent Historical Change in 10 National Systems of Innovation 
 
Economic Growth Rate 
(1975 – 2005) 
 
Direction of  
Innovative Activity 
(1980 - 2001) 





























1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Denmark Finland Ireland Nether-lands Norway
Sweden Hong Kong Singapore South Korea Taiwan  
 
a
 The term 1990 GK $ refers to “1990 US dollars converted at ‘Geary-Khamis’ purchasing power parities”. 
 
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre and The Conference Board, Total Economy 
Database, January 2006, available at: h tp://www.ggdc.net. 
 
